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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses four key markets within the European context. In this context, where 
the level of analyst coverage is lower than in the US setting, we aim to ascertain whether 
the origin of optimism in analyst forecasts in these markets is mainly strategic or whether 
it also contains an element of cognitive bias. Despite the fact that forecast errors lack the 
explanatory power to account for a significant percentage of the relationship between 
market sentiment and future stock returns, our new tests based on selection bias (SB1 and 
SB2), in conjunction with an analysis of abnormal trading volume, confirm the presence of 
both cognitive bias and strategic behaviour in analyst forecasts. This shows that, although 
regulation can reduce analyst optimism bias, the benefits are constrained by the fact that 
optimism bias is partly associated with cognitive bias.  
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Is cognitive bias really present in analyst forecasts? The role of investor 
sentiment 
1-Introduction 
Financial analysts play an important role collecting, processing and distributing 
financial information about firms to investors. They issue value-relevant information for 
end-users about corporate data, although there is widespread evidence that they fail to 
fully reflect all the available information in their forecasts. This stream of research has also 
shown extensively that analysts are optimistic in their Earnings Per Share (EPS) forecasts 
(see Brown, 1997 and Chopra, 1998, among others). This circumstance produces two 
opposite effects. On the one hand, if analysts are optimistic, their accuracy is lower and, 
consequently, their credibility and ranking may suffer. On the other hand, upward-biased 
forecasts generate investment banking business or commissions for analysts’ brokerage 
houses, which could compensate for the previous negative effect.  
Several studies have investigated the causes of this optimism because its potential 
correction and consequences are clearly linked to its origin. Recent studies have re-ignited 
the debate about whether the observed optimism is due to strategic behaviour by analysts 
(see Ertimur et al., 2011 or Karamanou, 2011) or if it is mainly motivated by their cognitive 
bias (see Qian, 2009 or Hribar and McInnis, 2012).  
One of the variables associated with cognitive bias is investor sentiment. This is a 
variable that reflects optimism or pessimism about stocks in general (Baker, et al. 2012) or 
investor opinion, usually influenced by emotion, about future cash flows and investment 
risk (Chang, et al. 2012). The existence of high or low sentiment in the market may affect 
all the participants therein, including financial analysts. Hribar and McInnis (2012), 
analysing the US market, find that when sentiment is high, analyst forecasts are relatively 
more optimistic for hard-to-value stocks. They also find that forecast errors account for a 
sizeable percentage of the explanatory power of the sentiment variable for cross-sectional 
futures returns, thus providing support for the argument that investor sentiment affects 
earnings expectations in this type of stocks.  
European financial markets are subject to less analyst coverage than the US market, as 
noted by Jegadeesh and Kim (2006), who found levels of around 90% for US firms and no 
higher than 25% for European firms during the period 1993-2002. This characteristic 
enhances the attractiveness of the European setting for the purposes of our study, because 
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it means that we are likely to find less cognitive bias because the type of stocks being 
followed by analysts are less prone to behavioural biases. This makes the European setting 
a suitable framework in which to test for significant levels of cognitive bias in analyst 
forecasts, using the investor sentiment as the measuring instrument, this being the main 
objective of our paper.  
To explore this issue, we begin by testing whether investor sentiment affects EPS 
forecasts and whether the impact varies with stock type. Our results reveal that investor 
sentiment affects forecast errors, especially in hard-to-value stocks. The next question is 
whether analyst forecast errors play a role in the sentiment-return relationship as an 
indicator of expectation errors, which would confirm the presence of cognitive bias. Our 
results, unlike those obtained by Hribar and McInnis (2012) for the US market, show that 
forecast errors lack the power to provide a significant part of the explanation for the link 
between investor sentiment and future stock returns. Thus, we have no evidence of the 
presence of cognitive bias in these markets. Nor, however, do we have any evidence to prove 
its absence. In order to shed further light on the issue, therefore, we check for the presence 
of strategic behavior and cognitive bias in analyst forecasts by running two new tests based 
on selection bias (which is when analysts decline to make any forecast rather than issue a 
negative one). We run these tests in conjunction with an analysis of abnormal trading 
volume in hard-to-value versus less hard-to-value stocks, in order to discern between 
different causes in the event of the tests proving inconclusive. The combined results of 
these tests confirm the presence of a significant degree of both biases (strategic and 
cognitive) in analyst forecasts. Despite the contrasting characteristics of the markets 
considered, the results are robust, which increases their generalizability. The fact that no 
significant differences emerge between the UK (representative of the Anglo Saxon financial 
system) and the other European markets (representative of the Continental financial 
system) is an indication that issues relating the type of financial system do not significantly 
alter the impact of strategic or cognitive bias on the degree of optimism in analyst forecasts. 
This paper contributes to the literature in various ways. Firstly, we conduct our analysis 
in the previously unstudied context of European financial markets, which, as already 
stated, contrast with the US market by having a lower level of analyst coverage.  
Secondly, the analysis of four key European countries (France, Germany, Spain and the 
UK) with different stock characteristics (Corredor et al., 2013a), corporate governance 
structures (see La Porta et al., 1998), and cultural dimensions (see Hofstede, 2001) will 
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enable us to check the robustness of the results to these differences within that context1. 
Despite constraints due to the small number of countries considered, we also test to see 
whether the UK, as a representative of the Anglo Saxon system, presents significant 
variation with respect to the other three, which can be taken to represent the continental 
system. This enables us to compare the impact of this kind of differences with that of 
analyst coverage levels, when trying to determine what drives the optimism in analyst 
forecasts.  
Thirdly, as a methodological contribution, we develop new tests based on the concept of 
selection bias (Selection Bias 1, SB1 and Selection Bias 2, SB2). SB1 enables us to test for 
the presence of strategic bias in analyst forecasts. SB2 is a modified version of SB1 for use 
with more sentiment-prone stocks in the presence of high investor sentiment. When 
combined with an analysis of abnormal trading volume, SB2 enables us to test for the 
presence of cognitive bias or strategic bias linked to the level of investor sentiment2. It 
should be emphasized that these statistics enable us to detect strategic bias both 
conditional on and unconditional on investor sentiment, a distinction that was not possible 
with other approaches. This type of joint analysis enables us to see whether the optimism 
in analyst forecasts is strategic (be it conditional on sentiment or not), cognitive, or a 
mixture of the two. Previous studies analysing the origin of such optimism have focused on 
just one of these biases, sometimes using non-conclusive testing methods. 
The practical implications of these results are very important because, any demonstrated 
cognitive element in the observed analyst bias will reduce the effectiveness of regulations 
aimed at correcting potential bias in analyst behaviour.  
The paper is organized as follows: the second section presents the theoretical framework. 
The third describes the database, the European setting, details of the construction of the 
investor sentiment proxy and the calculation of EPS forecast errors. Section four examines 
the effect of investor sentiment on EPS forecast errors. The results of the analysis of 
expectation errors as a driver of the sentiment-return relationship and the different tests to 
determine whether cognitive bias is really present in analyst forecasts appear in sections 5 
                                                          
1 Our work will include both individual and aggregate analyses of these markets, in order to increase the 
generalizability of the results. The analysis of individual markets will enable us to check the robustness of our 
findings to cross-country differences. Note that our aim is not to test the impact of any single factor (stock 
characteristics, corporate governance structure or cultural dimensions) on a specific result, since this would 
require us to investigate a very large number of countries in order to isolate any other differentiating features.  
 
2 Strategic bias may be unconditional on sentiment (tested by the SB1 statistic) or conditional on sentiment 
(tested by the SB2 statistic). The latter case is when analysts are aware that investors are optimistic due to 
high market sentiment and decide to issue more optimistic forecasts than they would under other 
circumstances, simply because they think investors will believe them, not because they themselves are led by 
the level of market sentiment. 
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and 6, respectively. Finally, section seven presents the main conclusions that emerge from 
the paper. 
2-Theoretical framework 
The literature on EPS forecast errors has widely shown that they are positively biased 
(Brown, 1997, Chopra, 1998; Richardson, et al., 2004, and Qian, 2009, among others). The 
incentives to issue optimistic forecasts are diverse. There is a link between analyst 
optimism bias, their career development, and their facility of access to non-public 
information (Das et al., 1998, Lim, 2001, Hong and Kubik, 2003, Chen and Matsumoto, 
2006, among others). Optimism in EPS forecasts is also associated with subsequent 
investment banking business and commissions for analysts’ brokerage houses (Lin and 
McNichols, 1998, Michaely and Womack, 1999, Lim, 2001, Cowen et al., 2006, Barber et al, 
2007 and Agrawal and Chen, 2008, among others). This evidence reflects companies’ 
preference for positive rather than negative forecasts, which could induce the bias detected.  
Francis (1997) suggests the existence of three different types of bias that could produce 
the optimism observed in analyst forecasts. Reporting bias reflects an explicit intention to 
mislead by artificially inflating earnings expectations. Selection bias is observed when 
analysts prefer not to issue a report rather than issue negative information about a 
company. The third, cognitive bias, is due to analysts inadequately processing the available 
information, and thereby being unable to produce unbiased forecasts. Although there are 
incentives to offer biased forecasts, the ultimate cause of analyst optimism is far from clear 
and there is an interesting ongoing debate with empirical evidence favourable to both 
explanations: strategic behaviour or cognitive bias (see Karamanou, 2011 and Ertimur et 
al., 2011 or Qian, 2009 and Hribar and McInnis, 2012, as recent examples of different 
conclusions regarding this issue). 
As already noted, investor sentiment is a variable that reflects optimism or pessimism 
about stocks in general and can therefore affect financial analysts. Baker and Wurgler 
(2006, 2007) show that, when investor sentiment is high/low, stock returns suffer an 
over/undervaluation which later revert to their fundamentals. 
The two main channels through which sentiment can affect pricing are sentiment-based 
demands and arbitrage constraints. In the first, sentimental demand shocks vary across 
stocks while arbitrage limits are constant. Interpreting sentiment as the propensity to 
speculate, sentiment increases the relative demand for stocks that are vulnerable to 
speculation, whose valuations are subjective and difficult to determine, and whose 
contemporaneous returns are higher than is justifiable. Specifically, small stocks, high 
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volatility stocks, extreme growth stocks, distressed stocks, young stocks and non-dividend-
paying stocks, are the most difficult to price and, therefore, the most vulnerable to investor 
sentiment. In the case of the second channel, the effect of changes in sentiment will be 
uniform while the difficulty of arbitrage will differ across stocks. Some papers, such as 
Baker and Wurgler (2006 and 2007), have shown that arbitrage is particularly costly and 
risky with certain stock types (young stocks, small stocks, unprofitable stocks, extreme 
growth stocks and distressed stocks). These two channels appear to affect the same type of 
stocks. The most speculative stocks are also the hardest to arbitrage and will therefore be 
the most strongly influenced by investor sentiment. Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) find 
this effect to be predominantly present in small stocks and those with less institutional 
ownership. Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) find that small stocks, young stocks, high 
volatility stocks, unprofitable stocks, non-dividend-paying stocks, extreme growth stocks 
and distressed stocks are the most heavily affected and likely to suffer from over- or under-
pricing, depending on investor sentiment. 
To the best of our knowledge, very few papers have analysed the relationship between 
investor sentiment and analyst optimism, by testing for the presence of sentiment as a 
component of analyst optimism, and they focus on the US market. Bergman and 
Roychowdhury (2008) and Qian (2009) present evidence of the association between 
sentiment and the bias in analyst earnings forecasts without making any in-depth 
exploration to determine whether the origin of analyst optimism is strategic or cognitive. 
Qian (2009) shows that analysts issue more optimistic earnings forecasts when sentiment is 
high, especially in smaller assets and value stocks. Hribar and McInnis (2012) also find this 
relationship. They also show that forecast errors are an intermediating variable in the 
relationship between sentiment and future stock returns. This finding supports the 
presence of cognitive bias in analysts. 
The different levels of analyst coverage in the US and European markets and their 
potential influence, particularly on the role of cognitive bias in the level of optimism in 
analyst forecasts, make it all the more worthwhile to take European markets as our 
framework of analysis in order ascertain whether it is possible to generalize the findings of 
Hribar and McInnis (2012). The four key European countries selected for analysis (France, 
Germany, Spain and the UK) have contrasting features stemming from their different 
financial systems: the Anglo Saxon system (UK) and the continental system, as well other 
market-specific differences. 
We base our analysis on a set of tests taken from the literature, and two new 
methodological proposals of our own  tests based on selection bias, SB1 and SB2, which 
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allow us to test for the presence of strategic behaviour (both conditional on and 
unconditional on sentiment) and cognitive bias in analyst forecasts.  
3-Database 
3.1 The European setting  
There are notable differences between the US market and European markets that can 
justify our interest in testing for the presence of strategic behaviour and cognitive bias in 
analyst forecasts. For one thing, the level of cross-listing in Europe is considerably lower 
than in the US and this has its implications. According to some estimates, clearing and 
settlement costs for European transactions are nine times higher than they are for US 
transactions, and the costs of cross-border transactions in Europe can be as much as forty-
six times higher than they are in the United States (London Stock Exchange 2001). 
Furthermore, despite a gradual convergence in the way European and the US stock 
markets work, some institutional differences still remain. The US regulatory authority is 
concentrated into a single agency, the SEC, which is responsible for setting standards.  In 
Europe, however, a history characterized by individual stock markets subject to domestic 
legislation has given way to an era of member-state-negotiated legislation under the 
direction of the European Union. In addition, European stock markets are not subjected to 
harmonized rules and the reforms introduced by the Directive do not mandate specific 
market structure rules beyond transparency requirements. Higher transaction costs, 
together with impediments to effective regulation might suggest a stronger analyst bias.  
Also, and more importantly for the objective in hand, there is a clear difference in the 
level of analyst coverage between US and European markets. Thus, Jegadeesh and Kim 
(2006) show that analyst coverage of US firms for the period 1993-2002 reached a level of 
around 90%, while in Europe it was never any higher than 25%. In particular, according to 
data collected by Jegadeesh and Kim (2006, Table I) the number of US firms with at least 
two active recommendations in the IBES database is 5.86 times the number of British 
firms, 12.72 times the number of French firms, 16.05 times the number of German firms 
and 39.94 times the number of Italian firms, the last of these being very similar to the 
number of Spanish firms. Although we use the FactSet as our reference database, the 
difference in analyst coverage between the US and Europe is no less important.  
Due to the very nature of the type of stocks followed by analysts, lower coverage implies 
less consideration of those stocks that are hard to value and to arbitrage, which are 
precisely the ones on which behavioural biases, such as those driven by investor sentiment, 
tend to have the strongest impact (see Baker and Wurgler, 2006, 2007 or Kumar, 2009). 
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In order to address this issue, this study uses data from four of the main European 
markets in terms of capitalization: France (FR), Germany (GE), Spain (SP) and the United 
Kingdom (UK). According to the World Federation of Exchanges classification for 2011, the 
London SE Group is the largest group in Europe in terms of capitalization, followed by 
NYSE Euronext (Europe), the Deutsche Börse and the BME Spanish Exchanges.  
 The reason for this choice of countries is to enable us to make reasonably homogeneous 
comparisons among assets and, thus, to control as much as possible for the potential 
influence of the level of development of the stock market in these comparisons. Our choice 
is based not only on the importance of the markets but also on the need to consider 
countries that differ with respect to cultural dimensions, corporate governance and the 
quality of the legal environment, and to include representatives of both the Anglo-Saxon 
and the Continental financial systems. The UK belongs to the Anglo-Saxon system, which 
is characterized by shareholder dispersion and a wider separation between ownership and 
control, while Germany, France and Spain form part of the Continental system, which has 
a highly concentrated ownership structure that promotes stability and commitment, 
although it reduces capital market liquidity. Another key feature of the Continental system 
is the presence of control groups, which means that managers are kept under strict control 
unless they belong to the power group. Most firms are under owner-management. Cross-
share holdings are another widespread feature. These characteristics mean that firms 
based on the Continental, or insider, model are quite different from those based on the 
Anglo-Saxon model, which is characterized by shareholder dispersion and a wider 
separation between ownership and control. In terms of institutional investor type, the 
majority of institutional investors in Continental Europe are banks, which take an active 
part in firm management, whereas, in the Anglo-Saxon system, they are predominantly 
mutual funds and pension funds. The Anglo Saxon system’s clearer orientation towards the 
stock market might give financial analysts a more prominent role in these markets. It has 
no direct implications for the potential impact of their strategic behaviour, however, 
because, although the higher trading volume associated with their activity might increase 
their incentive to act strategically, their actions are, by the same token, likely to come 
under stricter control. Thus, variation in the magnitude of the impact of this type of 
behaviour in analyst forecasts is an empirical issue. Furthermore, the fact that the 
magnitude of cognitive bias is apparently easier to relate to stock characteristics or cultural 
influences on market agents than to strictly institutional factors prevents us from 
developing the specific hypothesis that it varies with the type of financial system. The 
analysis described in this paper, as well as examining the various markets individually, 
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studies them overall and by type of financial system (Anglo Saxon vs Continental), in order 
to determine whether the latter has any implications for the findings. 
The study sample covers the period 1994-2007.  The accounting variables and stock 
prices are taken from the Datastream database (Thomson Financial) and the data relating 
to analyst activity are obtained from the FactSet database, which is affected by survival 
bias. Thus, the analysis covers all stocks currently and formerly listed in the four European 
markets considered and for which data from both databases are available for the study 
period. Following Ince and Porter (2006), we have screened and corrected the database. We 
have removed padded zero-return records at the end of delisted firms, we have removed all 
nonlocal firms and all listings other than those on the primary exchange and all listings 
with Type not equal to Equity. We include only those firms that checked YES in the 
“Primary quote” field. Based on these criteria, the final sample for the first year includes an 
average of 134 firms from France, 35 from Germany, 39 from Spain and 150 from the 
United Kingdom.  The average number of firms follows an overall upward trend. In 2007, 
specifically, these figures increase to 372 from France, 233 from Germany, 89 from Spain 
and 387 from the United Kingdom.  
During the period of this study, 1994-2007, there were significant EU accounting and 
reporting issues leading towards harmonized financial reporting in the EU that probably 
had an impact on investor markets and analysts' attitudes and perceptions3. These changes 
may have caused convergence of the attitudes of Anglo-Saxon and Continental analysts. In 
order to analyse this question, we test for time-period related variation in the differences 
between Anglo-Saxon and Continental results for the 1997-2004 and 2005-2007 sub-
periods.   
The stock characteristics used are book-to-market ratio (BTM)4, market value (SIZ), 
volatility (VOL)5 and dividend per share ratio (DIV). We measure all data in Euros, with 
the exception of the UK data which are expressed in pounds. 
3.2 - Investor Sentiment Measurement 
Previous studies have used various indicators for the measurement of the sentiment 
variable, although there is no consensus on the best way to measure this unobservable 
                                                          
3 For example, in 1995, the EC announced support for the International Accounting Standards Committee's 
international harmonization efforts. In 2000, the EC's "EU Financial Reporting Strategy: the way forward" led 
to the use of IAS by EU listed companies starting in 2005. In 2002, the EU Parliament and Council issued the 
IAS accounting regulation for listed companies. We are grateful to the anonymous reviewer #1 for this 
information. 
4 We remove stocks with negative book-to-market values. 
5 Volatility is obtained as the standard deviation of stock returns for the previous twelve months. 
10 
 
variable. The indicators used in the literature include investor survey findings (Brown and 
Cliff, 2005, and Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006), mutual fund flows (Brown et al., 2003; 
Frazzini and Lamont, 2008), the dividend premium (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a and b), the 
closed-end fund discount (Zweig, 1973; Lee, et al., 1991; Swaminathan, 1996, and Neal and 
Wheatley, 1998), trading volume or turnover (Jones, 2001; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; 
and Baker and Stein, 2004), and, more recently, composite sentiment indexes (Brown and 
Cliff, 2004; Baker and Wurgler, 2006, 2007).  
In recent papers, the tendency is to construct global sentiment indexes, which include 
local sentiment proxies. Baker et al. (2012) construct investor sentiment indexes for six 
major stock markets and compose them into one global sentiment index. Chang et al. (2012) 
use the first main component of US, UK, French and German sentiment as a measure of 
global investor sentiment. In this paper, we construct a global sentiment index because, as 
well as this being the current trend in studies analysing market sentiment, we consider it 
particularly relevant given the global environment in which financial analysts operate. 
Financial intermediaries have expanded internationally, have obtained membership in 
multiple exchanges and trading venues, and have grown both through a larger network of 
clients and through increased consolidation in the investment banking business. For these 
reasons, we take the common component in US and Europe sentiment6 as a measure of 
global investor sentiment.  
As a proxy of US sentiment, we use the composite index constructed by Baker and 
Wurgler (2006, 2007) (SentUS) which is made up of 6 sentiment indicator variables: the 
closed-end fund discount, stock turnover, the number of IPOs and the average first-day 
returns, the share of equity issues in total equity and debt issues and the dividend 
premium7. The European sentiment index (SentEU) collects information about the investor 
sentiment of four key European markets: France (SentFR), Germany (SentGE), Spain 
(SentSP) and the UK (SentUK). Following Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Baker et al 
(2012), we use principal components analysis to isolate the common component. We build a 
composite sentiment index of these four markets. Firstly, we obtain four local composite 
indexes. The variables included in each local sentiment index are: turnover, the volatility 
premium and the consumer confidence index8. In line with Baker and Wurgler (2006), we 
start with the estimation of the first main components of these three variables and their 
                                                          
6 Due to lack of data, we exclude the Japanese sentiment index and all other Asian references. 
7 The BW index data are available on the website of Wurgler http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~jwurgler 
8 The reason for the consideration of these three variables is their relationship with the level of sentiment. 
Details of the construction of the volatility premium are available in Baker et al. (2012). Finally, consumer 
confidence has been used in numerous studies such as Brown and Cliff (2005) and Lemmon and Portniaguina 
(2006), among others. The index of consumer confidence data comes from the website of the European 
Commission http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/index_en.htm 
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lags. This gives a first stage with six loadings and the variable index is included in t or t-1, 
depending on which is most highly correlated with the first-stage index. After obtaining the 
four local composite indexes, they are included in the construction of the European 
sentiment index. The European sentiment index coefficients are: 
 
SentEUt = 0.32 * SentFRt + 0.43 * SentGEt + 0.34 * SentSPt + 0.27 * SentUKt         (1) 
  
This main component explains 51.87% of the total variance.  
Finally, as a measure of overall sentiment (SentG), we form a composite index that 
captures the common component in the SentUS and SentEU indexes. This first main factor 
explains 81.15% of the sample variance, enabling us to conclude that one factor captures 
much of the common variation. The resulting index is:  
 
SentGt = 0.55 * SentUSt + 0.55 * SentEUt                                                        (2) 
  
The SentUS and SentEU indexes show positive and significant correlation (0.65), while 
the correlation of each of these indexes with the SentG is 0.908. Note that each sentiment 
index is likely to include a sentiment component as well as a common economic cycle 
component. For this reason, we construct a new global index that explicitly removes the 
effect of possible changes in the economic cycle9. 
 
 
3.3-Calculation of EPS forecast errors  
Analyst forecasts and annual EPS data are obtained from the Factset database10. We 
collect consensus (median) quarterly EPS forecasts, from January 1994 to December 2007. 
EPS forecast errors are defined as the difference between actual EPS for the fiscal year y, 
minus the quarterly consensus (median) forecast for the fiscal year y, scaled by the absolute 
value of the EPS consensus forecast. In order to reduce the EPS skewness effect, we 
                                                          
9 Following Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Schmeling (2009), the macroeconomic variables considered are the 
industrial production index, consumption of durable and non-durable goods and the rate of unemployment. The 
construction of this new index is similar to the previous one. However, the three initial individual measures are 
orthogonalized on these macroeconomic variables.  
10As well as the major international firms that regularly send their recommendations to I/B/E/S, contributors to 
this database include some domestic analysts, which results in wider coverage in European countries. 
Nevertheless, like other forecast databases, FactSet is affected by potential survivorship bias, and also selection 
bias, because it collects recommendations and forecasts from brokerage houses that collaborate on a voluntary 
basis. Correction of these two biases is not possible. 
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consider median consensus instead of mean consensus11. The choice of the variable used to 
scale the errors is not obvious. The literature has provided several alternatives for scaling 
forecast errors. The most common option appearing in previous works is to scale by stock 
prices (Brown, 1997; Chopra, 1998; Gu and Wu, 2003 and Richardson, et al, 2004). 
Nevertheless, in line with the arguments put forward by Qian (2009), when stock prices are 
used to scale forecast errors they are "artificially" reduced in the case of high stock prices. 
As an alternative, Qian (2009) scales errors by the total asset per share and the book value 
of equity, while Hribar and McInnis (2012) use the absolute value of the consensus forecast. 
We adopt the approach used by Hribar and McInnis (2012)12. In further agreement with 
these authors, we reduce the sensitivity of the results to small EPS by removing stocks with 
absolute earnings forecasts of less than 0.10 euros. Following Gu and Wu (2003) and Qian, 
(2009), the sample is limited to stocks whose fiscal year ends in December and we exclude 
EPS forecasts issued less than 90 days before the earnings report dates13.The EPS forecast 
error is calculated as follows: 
yti
ytiytii
yt
medianconsensusEPSFYABS
medianconsensusEPSFYEPSactual
FE
,,
,,,,
, ))(1(
)(1−
=                                                        (3) 
where FEit,y is the EPS forecast error of stock i in quarter t for the fiscal year y, 
EPSactuali,t,y, is the actual EPS of asset i in quarter t for the fiscal year y and 
EPSFY1consensus (median)i,t,y is the consensus (median) EPS forecast of stock i in quarter 
t for the fiscal year y. Finally, ABS denotes the absolute value of a variable.  
A negative value of the EPS forecast error (FEit,y) indicates analyst optimism, since the 
EPS forecast issued is greater than the company’s actual EPS for this fiscal year.  
In order to observe the impact of sentiment on different stocks, we group them into 
quintiles by size, volatility, BTM ratio and dividend per share. Thus, each quarter, we sort 
the assets into quintiles by the characteristic j. We then compute the average EPS forecast 
errors in the following quarter. This procedure allows us to compare the two extreme 
quintiles (the first and the fifth), since a greater sentiment effect is expected in quintiles 
with assets whose characteristics are associated with difficulty of valuation and arbitrage 
(i.e., the first quintile in size and dividends per share and the fifth quintile in volatility). 
                                                          
11 However, the analysis has been carried out with both measurements of consensus recommendations and the 
results are virtually the same. 
12 We do not have total asset per share data. However, as a robustness test, we have also scaled EPS forecast 
errors by the price and the book value of equity and the results, in general, are similar to those shown in Table 
II, despite the inconvenience of some loss of observations due to the elimination of data with negative book 
value. Results are available on request from the authors.  
 
13  The initial (final) numbers of observations following application of the above-mentioned criteria are: France 
15,194 (14,547), Germany 6,571 (5,925), Spain 4,531 (4,092) and UK 15,786 (15,319). 
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In Panel A of Table I, we present the average and median values of analysts' EPS 
forecast errors for the entire set of assets. In Panel B, we present the results for the 
extreme quintiles of each stock characteristic. When we analyse the whole data set, the 
results are very clear in all four markets and show that EPS forecast errors are negative, 
confirming the analyst optimism that had been detected in other markets. Furthermore, 
median EPS forecast errors are less negative than the average, which indicates that the 
errors are negatively skewed. In general, comparison of the extreme quintiles of the stock 
characteristics allows us to affirm that hard-to-value and difficult-to-arbitrage stock 
quintiles show more optimism, on average, than their opposites. This result is evident in 
the smaller, more volatile and lower dividend-per-share stocks, in which EPS forecast 
errors are very important. Classification by BTM ratios yields less clear results. The 
difference between the extreme quintiles is only significant in the case of the Spanish and 
French markets, the first quintile being more negative. These results may be due to the 
effect of two stock dimensions that are related to the BTM ratio, namely, high growth (the 
first quintile), and high distress risk (the fifth quintile). 
 [Insert Table I] 
4-The effect of sentiment on forecast errors  
Previous results have shown that analysts tend to be optimistic, issuing earnings 
forecasts greater than the earnings companies actually obtain. One of the possible causes of 
this may be the reaction of analysts to variations in the level of sentiment. Hribar and 
McInnis (2012) find evidence supportive of this notion in the US market. However, lower 
analyst coverage of European markets limits our sample, by excluding some firms with 
high sensitivity to investor sentiment. This increases the importance of testing the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis H1: In European markets, investor sentiment is positively and significantly 
related to analyst forecast errors. 
In order to test this hypothesis we estimate the following equation: 
c
t
c
t
c
t
ccc
t uSkewSentGFE +++=
⊥⊥
−
γβα 1                                                                               (4) 
where ctFE  is the EPS forecast errors consensus (median) for all of the stocks in country c 
and quarter t. SentG⊥ is the investor sentiment variable orthogonal to the economic 
variables. Following Qian (2009), we also include a proxy for the skewness in analyst 
forecast errors ( ⊥ctSkew ) as a control variable, because optimistic bias can result from 
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analysts’ efforts to improve forecast accuracy when the distribution of earnings is skewed 
(Gu and Wu, 2001). Finally, an AR (1) model is applied to correct for serial correlation. OLS 
estimation is used with the Newey and West (1987) standard errors.  
The results obtained in the estimation of equation 4 are shown in Panel A of Table II. 
The data show that both the EPS forecast errors of the previous period and the skewness in 
analyst forecasts positively affect EPS forecast errors in the current period. The impact of 
investor sentiment on the EPS forecast errors is clearly significant and negative for the four 
European markets analysed. Obviously, the same result is obtained for the whole set of 
countries, with no significant differences being observed between those belonging to the 
Anglo Saxon and those belonging to the continental financial system. All of these results 
support the null hypothesis H1. This shows that latent market optimism makes analysts, 
on average, more optimistic, as reflected in higher earnings forecasts and, consequently, 
larger errors. Therefore, analysts appear to be influenced in their forecasts, either 
consciously or unconsciously, by investor sentiment. All of this enables us to conclude that 
the generalization of these results to all the European markets analysed is not diminished 
by the impact of their various differences. 
[Insert Table II] 
Given that, as the literature has shown, investor sentiment has a stronger impact on 
hard-to-value or difficult-to-arbitrage stocks (see Baker and Wurgler 2006, 2007 or 
Corredor et al, 2013a) and taking into account findings by Hribar and McInnis (2012) 
showing that in the US market these stocks are associated with more optimistic EPS 
forecasts, it is worth testing this hypothesis for the European market. The specific 
hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis H2: In European markets, the positive relationship between investor 
sentiment and forecast errors is stronger in hard-to-value or difficult-to-arbitrage stocks. 
To test hypothesis 2, we estimate a system of equations adapted to the two extreme 
quintiles of each characteristic j 
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−
γβα                      c=1 to 4                                    (5) 
where jc tqFE
,
,
is the average of the EPS forecast errors in the stocks belonging to  quintile q 
(first and fifth)  for country c, characteristic j and quarter t. We include the skewness in the 
analyst forecast errors of each quintile orthogonal to investor sentiment and, finally, the 
investor sentiment variable orthogonal to macroeconomic variables.  
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The impact of investor sentiment on EPS forecast errors for each quintile is shown in 
Panel B of Table II14. The results are in line with our expectations and support hypothesis 
H2. The results of the analysis of volatility portfolio are unanimous for the four markets. 
The impact of sentiment on the more volatile stocks is greater than observed in less volatile 
stocks, and the difference between the two groups is significant for the four markets 
analysed. In the case of the UK, in the analysis of portfolios classified by size and dividend-
per-share, the first quintile (which contains the stocks most sensitive to investor sentiment) 
has coefficients superior in magnitude to those of the fifth quintile, the differences being 
significant in both cases. The coefficients of these characteristics are also higher in the first 
quintile in the other stock markets, although they are not significant15. When we study 
portfolios sorted by BTM, the impact is higher in the first quintile than in the fifth, but the 
differences are in no case significant16.  
Table II summarizes the findings for all the markets analysed. We also show the results 
for full sample, continental subset and the differences in coefficients between the Anglo 
Saxon and Continental subsets. As in the case above, the results for the whole set of 
European markets support the main reported finding that the positive relationship 
between investor sentiment and forecast errors is significantly stronger when volatility and 
DPS are used as an approximation of the sensitivity of stocks to investor sentiment. The 
results for the Continental subset are similar in overall terms to those obtained for the 
entire sample. In agreement with the above finding, the various tests performed show that 
there are no significant differences associated with the market belonging to the Anglo 
Saxon vs the Continental financial system. Finally, in spite of the significant EU 
accounting and reporting issues leading towards harmonized financial reporting in the EU, 
we do not find significant variations in the differences between the Anglo Saxon and 
Continental financial systems for the 1997-2004 and 2005-2007 sub-periods. This result 
could be due either to the progressive nature of the harmonization process or to the brevity 
of the last sub-period. 
To sum up, analyst optimism is related to the level of investor sentiment. This 
relationship is stronger in hard-to-value and difficult-to-arbitrage stocks, especially when 
                                                          
14 The impact of the AR(1) and skewness variables is similar to that shown in A Panel. The results are available 
on request from the authors. 
15 When we analyse size for the French stock market the observations were winsorized at the 99% level due to 
the presence of extreme values.  
16 The recent decrease in analyst optimism reported in the literature motivated us to extend our sample period 
back to 2001 in order to test for any associated variation in the impact of market sentiment on forecast errors. 
The results reveal a significantly negative sentiment effect throughout the whole sample period, suggesting that 
the reduction in optimism does not seriously affect our reported results. 
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these characteristics are proxied by stock volatility17. Given that the main effect of 
sentiment on EPS forecast errors appears in the high volatility portfolio, the following 
analysis is restricted to these assets only. In fact, Baker and Wurgler (2006), Chang et al 
(2012), Joseph et al (2011),  Baker et al (2012) and Corredor et al (2013a,b) use volatility 
portfolios to proxy for hard-to-value and difficult-to-arbitrage stocks because the observed 
effects are stronger than for other characteristics.  
5. Do errors-in-expectations drive the relationship between sentiment and 
future stock returns? 
Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) and Chang, et al. (2012), among others, analyse the 
relationship between sentiment and stock returns and find long-term price reversal to 
fundamentals. Hribar and McInnis (2012) include EPS forecast errors in the relationship 
between stock returns and investor sentiment and try to determine whether EPS forecast 
error is an intermediating variable between sentiment and returns and whether its 
inclusion reduces or even eliminates the explanatory power of sentiment. They obtain 
favourable evidence for the US market.  Based on their work, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis H3: In the European setting EPS forecast error is an intermediating variable 
between sentiment and returns. 
As noted by Hribar and McInnis (2012), confirmation of the above hypothesis implies the 
presence of cognitive bias in analysts. The cited authors formulate the following regression  
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where c tlow
c
thigh RR ,, −  is the self-financed portfolio return based on volatility for country c and 
and month t. tDSentG  is the dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if investor sentiment in 
December of year t-1 is above the median level and equal to 0 otherwise. c tdiffFE ,  is the 
difference between the two portfolios in terms of forecast errors. As the results may be due 
to the significant exposure of the volatility portfolio to traditional risk factors, Fama and 
French (1993) factors (RMRF, SMB and HML) are included for each market18.  
                                                          
17 DPS variable is only significant at the 10% level for the full sample, while volatility is significant at the 1% 
level. The empirical evidence for the BTM variable yields mixed results, due to the fact that both high and low 
volatility can proxy for high sensitivity to sentiment. Finally, analysts’ bias towards large stocks makes size a 
poor proxy for hard-to-value and difficult-to-arbitrage stocks.  
18 See Fama and French (1993) and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) for details of the construction of risk factors 
and the construction of the return variable, respectively. Due to the observed causality of investor sentiment on 
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In our view, however, this relationship would be better specified as follows: 
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tdiffcktckckc ktlowc kthigh uHMLSMBRMRFFESentGRR ,,,, ++++++=− ⊥++ λωδγβα            (7) 
where c ktlow
c
kthigh RR ++ − ,,  is the self-financed portfolio return based on volatility for country c 
and holding period k,  ⊥tSentG  is the investor sentiment variable, orthogonal to economic 
variables, and defined as a continuous variable. The remaining variables are the same as 
those specified in (6). 
Our reason for proposing specification (7) is that investor sentiment, as has been 
abundantly shown in the literature, has a more notable mid-term impact, and cannot be 
fully captured by analysing a portfolio with a month-long holding period. However, the 
inclusion of portfolios with k holding periods raises problems due to autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity of overlapping observations. To address these issues, the portfolio return 
is computed in calendar time, following Jegadeesh and Titman (2001). In addition, we use a 
continuous variable (instead of a dummy variable) as the sentiment proxy, which we 
orthogonalize to macroeconomic variables to control for economic cycle effects. 
Table III presents the results of the estimation of equation (6) (with tDSentG [6.1], with 
tSentG [6.2], and with 
⊥
tSentG  [6.3]) and equation (7) for a holding period of 12 months for the 
full sample of markets considered, using dummy variables to represent France, Germany 
and Spain, in order to facilitate comparison between the Anglo Saxon and Continental 
financial systems. We estimate equation (6) in order to make more direct comparisons 
between our findings and those of Hribar and McInnis (2012) and rule out methodological 
issues as the source of any differences. However, we also estimate equation (7) using the 
tSentG [7.1] variable and our final proposal using 
⊥
tSentG  [7.2]. 
Despite the different specifications of the two equations, the conclusions are identical. 
The estimates in columns [6.1], [6.2], [6.3], [7.1] and [7.2] show the effect of sentiment on 
future returns in line with Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007). The results also show that the 
impact of sentiment on future returns is negative and significant in all the models. The 
explanation of this phenomenon is that high sentiment produces overpricing followed by 
reversion to equilibrium. This effect is more predominant in high volatility stocks, as shown 
by the negative sign on the estimated coefficient. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the stock returns, the market factor is orthogonalized to the sentiment index to control for multicollinearity 
among the independent variables.  
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These results are clearly consistent with those obtained in the literature on the 
relationship future returns-sentiment. Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007), Baker, et al. 
(2012), Chang, et al (2012) and Corredor et al (2013a) found this same pattern for both the 
American market and international markets.  
[Insert Table III] 
The coefficient of EPS forecast error is not significant in any of the cases analysed19. 
Therefore, this variable does not in itself seem to have any impact on future returns. These 
results permit us to reject hypothesis 3 while also casting doubt on the possibility that the 
detected relationship between sentiment and EPS forecast errors is due to error- in-
expectations. These results clearly differ from those presented by Hribar and McInnis 
(2012) for the US market, by showing that EPS forecast errors help to explain the future 
stock returns-sentiment relationship found by Baker and Wurgler (2006). This difference in 
results cannot be attributed to methodological factors, however, because the specification 
(6) is the one used by Hribar and McInnis (2012) and yields the same results as the rest. In 
addition, the results hold both for the full sample and the subset of Continental European-
type markets, no significant differences having been observed between their average values 
and those of the UK market. Finally, we find no significant time-period-related variation in 
the differences between the two financial systems for the 1997-2004 and 2005-2007 sub-
periods. 
The evidence that the undermining effect of forecast errors on the predictive power of 
sentiment for future returns is driven by errors-in-expectations would confirm the presence 
of cognitive bias. Nevertheless, analysts can still fall prey to cognitive bias, even though 
forecast errors cannot explain future returns. Thus, the rejection of hypothesis 3 does not 
necessarily rule out cognitive bias as the driver of analyst optimism.  In fact, our first 
analysis has shown that sentiment is a key explanatory factor of forecast errors that might 
be consistent with the presence of cognitive bias. The results may be an indication that the 
relationship between sentiment and stock returns is more complex or that lower analyst 
coverage may reduce the suitability of using analyst forecast errors as a means to measure 
errors-in-expectations by investors in European markets20.  
                                                          
19 Observation of the data for individual markets shows that this coefficient is significant for the French stock 
market, although this does not undermine the explanatory power of investor sentiment. 
20 A survey of 365 analysts by Brown et al (2013) aimed at revealing the forces that motivate analysts’ decisions 
shows that single most important determinant of their compensation and main input in their forecasts and 
recommendations is industry knowledge. The second most important factor is broker votes (a measure of client 
satisfaction). Analysts claim that the most useful way to obtain information is through private telephone calls, 
adding that it is essential for them to keep in close touch with company managers. The cited study does not 
directly analyse optimism or its explanatory factors. Future research in that direction might further 
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6-Does cognitive bias significantly affect analyst forecasts? 
Although the lack of significance of forecast errors in the relationship between sentiment 
and futures returns casts some doubt on the importance of cognitive bias in analyst 
behaviour, it does not completely invalidate this explanation. If analysts are aware of the 
state of investor sentiment, they will be able to exploit it by issuing more optimistic 
forecasts than they would have otherwise. This will bring them personal profit in the form 
of commissions from brokerage houses and from increased trading. Thus, sentiment-driven 
optimism in EPS forecasts may be due to analysts’ strategic use of investor sentiment. 
Nevertheless, it is also possible that, when sentiment is high, analysts may be 
unconsciously led by the tone of the market and issue abnormally optimistic earnings 
forecasts. The observed effect may, of course, also be due to a combination of both these 
factors. 
In order to analyse this issue in this paper, we propose two new tests based on selection 
bias (SB1 and SB2), which we apply in conjunction with an analysis of abnormal trading 
volume in hard-to-value stocks versus less hard-to-value stocks21. The first (SB1) will show 
us whether analysts behave strategically, but unconditional on the level of investor 
sentiment in the market. The second (SB2), which takes into account the impact of 
sentiment on selection bias for some types of stock, will, together with the analysis of 
abnormal trading volume, allow us to test for the additional presence of cognitive bias or 
strategic bias conditional on the level of investor sentiment.  
6.1. Strategic behaviour unconditional on the level of investor sentiment 
We will begin by examining the possibility of strategic behaviour unconditional on 
investor sentiment by testing the following null hypothesis: 
Hypothesis H4: Analysts operating in the European setting do not behave strategically in 
issuing optimistic forecasts. 
In order to test for the presence of strategic behaviour unconditional on investor 
sentiment, we begin by running a test (SB1) based on selection bias. Selection bias is the 
result of analysts opportunistically choosing the moment to release market information. 
When acting strategically, analysts will adjust their forecasts upward in the presence of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
understanding of the personal motives behind analysts’ actions. We are grateful to the anonymous reviewer #1 
for this observation. 
21 Hribar and McInnis (2012) perform two additional strategic behaviour checks which we also perform. We first 
test for variation, in the form of a decrease, or reversal, in the impact of sentiment on forecast errors when 
measured over shorter horizons. We then test whether analyst optimism translates into recommendations, 
which are their final output to investors. The results are not reported here for the sake of clarity. The first test 
does not find strategic behaviour but the second one suggests this behaviour in financial analysts. 
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positive news and will not adjust them downwards in the presence of negative news. When 
cognitive bias alone is present, however, any revision, whether upward or downward will be 
random. SB1 compares the ratio of upward revisions to pieces of positive news (RU) and the 
ratio of downward revisions to pieces of negative news (RD). This reveals whether analysts 
handle information strategically.  
wsPositiveNe
visionsUpwardRU Re=    and 
wsNegativeNe
visionsDownwardRD Re= ;   DU RRSB −=1   (9) 
Under the assumption of non-intentionality, both ratios should diverge only by chance, 
and the statistic will therefore have a value of 0. Furthermore, negative values of the 
statistic will also be inconsistent with the presence of strategic behaviour by investors. 
Therefore confirmation of the null hypothesis, H4, implies that the statistic SB1≤0. 
However, if their behaviour is strategic, and assuming that there are incentives for 
analysts to issue optimistic forecasts and recommendations, the RU ratio should be 
significantly greater than the RD ratio. Thus, in the presence of strategic behaviour by 
analysts unconditional on investor sentiment, the statistic will have positive values ( SBH4 : 
SB1>0).  
 
6.2 Cognitive bias and Strategic behaviour conditional on investor sentiment 
Having tested for the presence or absence of strategic behaviour by analysts 
unconditional on investor sentiment, we test for the presence of cognitive bias or strategic 
bias that is conditional on investor sentiment. Note that analysts can also act strategically 
in the presence of high investor sentiment, under the assumption that high optimism 
among investors at such times will camouflage their inflated price forecasts.  Based on 
these considerations, we propose the following null hypothesis: 
Hypothesis H5: In the European setting, the level of investor sentiment does not influence 
the level of analyst bias. 
Confirmation of the null hypothesis would indicate that the level of investor sentiment 
does not drive the aforementioned effect on strategic behaviour by analysts or lead to 
cognitive bias affecting the level of analyst optimism. 
To test this hypothesis, we perform a second test (SB2), which is a modified version of 
SB1 and takes into account the effect of sentiment on the relationship between news and 
EPS revisions. Assuming that high investor sentiment increases the level of optimism in 
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the EPS forecasts for hard-to-value and difficult-to- arbitrage stocks, the RU ratio in these 
stock types could increase or decrease significantly. Note that, under the assumption of 
strategic behaviour, the question of whether analysts make more upward or more 
downward revisions in relation to the number of pieces of positive news in hard-to-value 
and difficult-to-arbitrage stocks will depend on the strength of the opposing incentives. In 
other words, they will have to weigh up the incentives or pressures to issue optimistic 
forecasts when SEO and IPO activity is at a peak against the potential reputation costs of 
issuing over-optimistic forecasts that fail to materialize due to medium-term price reversal 
in these stock types (see Baker and Wurgler, 2006 and Corredor et al, 2013a). It is 
important to emphasize that, during periods of high market sentiment, the level of trading 
volume is sufficient to obviate the need for analysts to use optimistic forecasts to increase 
their business. In this line, Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008) show that managers 
strategically reduce the frequency of long-horizon earnings announcements during high 
sentiment periods. Thus, if analysts are not under too much pressure to issue optimistic 
forecasts, the net effect could be fewer upward revisions. However, if the origin of analyst 
optimism lies in a cognitive bias, a high level of investor sentiment will lead to an increase 
in their optimism and a greater effect should be observed in hard-to-value and difficult-to-
arbitrage stocks, which are the stocks on which investor sentiment has the most noticeable 
effect. Thus, a decrease in RU will provide the necessary evidence with which to conclude 
that the primary source of analyst optimism lies in their strategic intentions. But if RU is 
positive, the origin may be strategic (if the incentives or pressures to issue optimistic 
forecasts outweigh the reputational costs) or cognitive.  
The SB2 test compares the expected RU and RD ratios that are conditional on high level 
sentiment (HS) to their respective unconditional ratios.  
)()/(2 UUU REHSRESB −=  and  )()/(2 DDD REHSRESB −=    (10) 
Under the null hypothesis of the absence of any effect of investor sentiment in the RU 
and RD ratios, the SB2U and SB2D statistics should be zero (H5,0: SB2U=SB2D=0).  
The alternative hypotheses (analysts behaving strategically conditional on investor 
sentiment, StBH5 , or cognitive bias, 
CgBH5 ) may significantly alter the behaviour of the SB2U 
statistic for the most volatile stocks (which are the most sensitive to investor sentiment).  
Under the alternative hypothesis of cognitive bias in analyst behaviour, CgBH5 , the SB2U 
statistic will be positive ( CgBH5 : SB2U > 0). 
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The alternative hypothesis of strategic behaviour by analysts, StBH5 depends on whether 
or not reputational costs outweigh the remaining incentives for analysts. In particular, the 
SB2U statistic should be negative if the reputational costs for analysts outweigh either their 
incentives to make the most of high investor sentiment to drive up trading volume or the 
pressures they are under to issue optimistic forecasts in order to support SEOs or IPOs. 
( :1,5
StBH (Reputational costs > Firms pressure) SB2U < 0). But the SB2U statistic should be 
positive if it is due to strategic behaviour when the reputational costs do not outweigh the 
remaining incentives ( :2,5
StBH (Firms pressure > Reputational costs) SB2U > 0). 
Thus, the results for the SB2 statistic can indicate any of three possibilities: If the SB2U 
statistic is not different from zero, it will indicate the absence of cognitive bias or strategic 
behaviour linked to the pattern of investor sentiment. If the SB2U statistic is negative, it 
will indicate the presence of strategic bias. If the SB2U statistic is positive, it will raise the 
problem of origin identification, since the origin could be cognitive or strategic. We can 
overcome this problem, by tracing the source of the optimism by means of a complementary 
analysis of abnormal trading volume in hard-to-value stocks versus bond-like stocks during 
periods of high market sentiment. If analysts are strategically selecting hard-to-value 
stocks, the latter will have significantly higher abnormal trading volume than bond-like 
stocks. If, however, the difference in abnormal trading volume between these two stock 
types is negligible or even reversed, the only compatible explanation will be that analyst 
optimism is driven by cognitive bias.  
[Insert Figure 1] 
In the case of the SB2D statistic, the effect should be less pronounced than in the SB2U 
statistic. When strategic behaviour is present, a positive or not different from zero SB2D 
statistic is expected. Because negative news is more informative during periods of high 
sentiment, analysts taking into account the reputational costs, tend more frequently to 
revise downwards. Note, however, that pressures for analysts to issue optimistic forecasts 
to support SEO and IPO activity also have this effect. If optimism is mainly motivated by 
their cognitive bias, a negative or not different from zero SB2D statistic is expected, because 
negative news is not confirmed by their own expectations and they are not likely to revise 
their forecasts downward. Finally, the expected sign of the statistics for low volatility stocks 
is the same as that expected for high volatility stocks, but the statistics should probably not 
be significantly different from zero because, in these stocks, investor sentiment has less 
impact and the magnitude of the optimism bias will also be smaller. 
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6.3 Measuring SB1 and SB2 
The first step in computing SB1 and SB2 is to choose the stocks to construct the 
portfolio. For this purpose, each quarter, we sort the stocks by their volatility and group 
them into quintiles. We then calculate the percentage of quarters that each stock appears 
in each of the extreme quintiles, i.e., the first and fifth. Finally, the stocks selected as high 
(low) volatility will be those that, for more than 60% of the quarters, appear in the fifth  
(first) quintile and for less than 10% of the quarters in the first (fifth) quintile22. The 
number of upward and downward EPS revisions is obtained from Factset and we compute 
the number of revisions issued by the analysts following a firm during the last month of the 
quarter. The proxy for news is the unexpected stock return (20% extreme). As Antoniou et 
al (1998), Engle and Ng (1993) and Pagan and Schwert (1990) argue, it is typical to define 
news as the unexpected component of returns, ut.  Let rt be the return on a stock from t - 1 
to t and Φt-1 be the information set containing all relevant information up to time, t-1. The 
conditional expected return, ρt, is defined as E(rt|Φt-1) so news is defined as  ut = rt - ρt.  
Moreover, Engle and Ng (1993) assert that a large value of ut implies that the news is 
“significant” and it is critical to distinguish between positive and negative return shocks by 
examining the magnitude of a piece of news. To do this, they proposed  identifying the more 
extreme values using the αth percentile of the set of {ut}. Blasco et al (2010) find that using 
the top and bottom quintiles of the residual is a good proxy for good and bad news, 
respectively. For the sake of homogeneity, each quarter, we compute the total number of 
pieces of positive or negative news for each stock during the last month of the quarter.  
Finally, we compute the ratio of the number of upward EPS revisions (the number of 
downward EPS revisions) to the number of pieces of positive (negative) news on a quarterly 
basis23. It should be pointed out that our interest lies in the ratio of pieces of positive or 
negative news to the number of upward or downward revisions of forecasts, rather than the 
exact time they occur or their simultaneity (which, in any case, would be difficult to 
ascertain). The number of pieces of news and number of revisions, in aggregate, are 
informative about analyst behaviour and can therefore support our research aims. 
6.4 Empirical results 
Table IV presents the average values of the RU and RD ratios for the entire set of stocks 
and for the extreme volatility portfolios, and the SB1 statistic (RU-RD) with the p-value of 
the t-test of difference in means. The results of the SB1 test show that, in 3 of the 4 
                                                          
22 To ensure that the results are not firm-specific, the number of stocks in each market is greater or equal to 10.  
23 For the sake of homogeneity, both variables are standardized. 
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individual market analyses and in the full sample analysis24, the ratio of positive revisions 
to pieces of positive news (RU) is significantly greater than the ratio of negative revisions to 
pieces of negative news (RD), which enables us to reject the null hypothesis of the absence of 
strategic behaviour by analysts (H4). It is important to emphasize that these results are not 
conditional on investor sentiment. They are a consequence of analysts behaving 
strategically in response to their incentives. We find no differences between the Anglo 
Saxon and Continental systems and no significant variation in this result between sub-
periods (1997-2004 and 2005-2007)25. 
[Insert Table IV] 
The results of these SB2 tests are shown in Table IV. The SB2U test, the difference 
between the expected RU in the conditional and unconditional cases, for the high volatility 
portfolio is significant in two of the four individual markets analysed (the UK and Spain), 
and also for the full sample and the Continental subset. In the other two markets, when the 
RU ratio is conditional on high sentiment, it displays a higher average than when it is not, 
although the variance is too high to obtain SB2U tests significantly different from zero. The 
results of the SB2D test, the difference between the expected RD in the conditional and 
unconditional cases, for the high volatility portfolio in no case differ significantly.  
To sum up in two of the individual markets considered, for the sample as a whole, and 
indistinctly for both financial systems (Anglo Saxon and Continental26), we are able to 
reject the null hypothesis, H5, of absence of biases linked to the level of investor sentiment. 
However, given that the SB2U statistic is positive in all cases, we perform an additional 
analysis based on the abnormal trading volume of hard-to-value versus bond-like stocks 
during periods of high market sentiment, in order to determine the root cause of the 
rejection of the null (cognitive bias or strategic behaviour conditional on sentiment). 
To carry out this complementary analysis, we need to compute the mean abnormal 
trading volume for the volatility portfolios used to compute SB2, which is the variable we 
use as the proxy indicator of hard-to-value stocks, during periods of high investor 
sentiment. To compute the average trading volume for each portfolio, the trading volume of 
each stock is standardized by its historical mean and the abnormal trading volume is 
obtained by subtracting from this the average volume for the past 12 months. Thus, at the 
                                                          
24 No significant differences emerge for the Continental subset, or between these and the UK (which does show 
a significant degree of strategic bias). These incoherencies may be due to the high volatility of the data. 
25 Although the sign of the statistic SB1 is negative, suggesting some lessening of selection bias during the 
second sub-period, this reduction is not significant at conventional levels. 
26 Given that, throughout the entire 2005-2007 sub-period, there were only 3 quarters with high investor 
sentiment, we were unable to obtain sufficient observations to compute the SB2 test. 
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end of every three-month period, we obtain the abnormal trading volume of each stock in 
the last month, which enables us to compute the abnormal trading volume of the various 
quintiles. Table V shows the results of the test of difference of means between the top and 
bottom quintiles for each of the markets considered.  
[Insert Table V] 
The results are highly revealing. Indeed, in all the markets considered, the abnormal 
trading volume of the high-volatility portfolio is clearly lower than that of the low-volatility 
portfolio, except in the case of Germany, where the difference between the two is not 
significant (which is the reason for the lack of any significant differences when either the 
full sample or the Continental subset is considered27). This finding is in no way compatible 
with strategic behaviour on the part of analysts, since the stocks on which most of the 
optimism is concentrated generate less trading activity and therefore significantly less 
direct or indirect earnings for analysts. Given that the quintile-based portfolios include 
both stocks with buy recommendations and stocks with sell recommendations, we repeat 
the analysis using portfolios constructed exclusively from stocks with strong buy 
recommendations during the study period. Basically, the same results hold, thus ruling out 
the possibility of any skewness due to this characteristic. Finally, we construct portfolios 
from the three-month average returns, instead of the past month’s returns, obtaining the 
same results both in the overall analysis and in the screening for strong buy 
recommendations28. 
In combination, the results of SB1 and SB2 provide empirical evidence of both strategic 
behaviour and cognitive bias linked to the level of investor sentiment, suggesting that the 
joint effect observed in analyst behaviour in the European markets considered can only be 
explained by the concurrence of both phenomena. The fact that past forecast errors fail to 
fully explain the effect of market sentiment on returns, as shown, does not detract from the 
explanatory power of cognitive bias with respect to analyst behaviour. The relationship 
between the level of sentiment, forecast errors, and future stock returns may be too 
complex to be captured by the linear regression model proposed by Hribar and McInnis 
(2012). Thus emerges an interesting avenue for future research. 
  
                                                          
27 The high volume of abnormal trading in the first quintile for Germany results in a highly volatile statistic 
that prevents us from rejecting the null hypothesis for the full sample or the Continental subset. There is also 
no difference between the results for the Continental system and those of the Anglo Saxon system, where the 
presence of cognitive bias is detected. In conjunction with the result for the three individual markets, this 
enables us to assert (as the most plausible hypothesis overall) that the optimism in analyst forecasts is due to 
the presence of cognitive bias.  
28 These results are available upon request from the authors. 
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7-Conclusions 
This study focuses on the debate regarding the source of optimism in analyst forecasts. 
Recent papers have rekindled the debate about whether the optimism observed is due to 
analysts behaving strategically (see Karamanou, 2011 or Ertimur et al., 2011) or is a 
consequence of cognitive bias (see Hribar and McInnis, 2012).  
In this paper, we analyse the effect of investor sentiment on analyst expectations in the 
European context, where the level of analyst coverage is lower than in the US setting, from 
which most of the previous empirical evidence has emerged. In pursuing this objective, we 
study the four most important European markets in terms of capitalization, which exhibit 
significant differences in stock characteristics, financial systems (Anglo Saxon vs 
Continental) and cultural dimensions that will ensure the robustness of our results. The 
results confirm the presence of optimism bias in analyst forecasts. Moreover, we find that 
investor sentiment significantly affects forecast errors in all of the markets analysed (thus 
confirming the null hypothesis, H1), a bias which is more pronounced in assets with high 
sensitivity to investor sentiment, namely, those that are hard to value or difficult to 
arbitrage (thus confirming the null hypothesis, H2). Despite the fact that forecast errors 
lack the explanatory power to account for a significant percentage of the relationship 
between market sentiment and future stock returns (thus allowing us to reject the null 
hypothesis, H3), the results from our new tests based on selection bias (SB1 and SB2) 
confirm the presence of both cognitive bias and strategic behaviour in analyst forecasts. In 
particular, the results enable us to reject the null hypothesis, H4, that analysts do not 
behave strategically unconditional on market sentiment. We are also able to reject the null 
hypothesis, H5, that the level of market sentiment does not influence the degree of 
behavioural biases affecting analysts. The positive sign of the SB2 statistic, in conjunction 
with the results of an analysis of abnormal trading volume, support the alternative 
hypothesis, 
CgBH5 , by revealing the presence of cognitive bias in analysts that is conditional 
on investor sentiment.  
Findings by Ertimur et al (2011) or Karamanou (2011) reveal the presence of strategic 
behaviour in analysts’ actions. Furthermore, although cognitive bias could have less impact 
because analyst coverage is lower in the European markets, our results show that it, too, 
has a significant impact on analyst forecasts, which is consistent with the findings of 
Hribar and McInnis (2012) for the US market.  
It is important to emphasize the homogeneity of these findings across the various 
European markets considered. Indeed, the joint analysis of these markets reveals no 
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significant cross-country variation29 or differences associated with the nature of the 
financial system (Anglo Saxon vs Continental) to which they belong. This last result may 
also be due to significant EU accounting and reporting issues leading towards harmonized 
financial reporting in the EU context. 
The main practical implication of our results is that regulation can reduce analyst 
optimism because part of this optimism is strategic. However, the fact that the rest of this 
optimism is associated with a cognitive bias suggests limited regulatory effectiveness. The 
effect of this bias is greater in hard-to-value and difficult-to-arbitrage assets, which means 
that, in times of high investor sentiment, the EPS forecasts will be more upwardly biased 
for these types of assets, so investors should approach analysts’ predictions with a degree of 
caution. 
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Table I: Descriptive Statistics for Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Errors 
Panel A: All Stocks 
 Mean  Median St.Dv Min Max Per10% Per90% 
France -0.150 -0.128 0.113 -0.526 0.068 -0.288 -0.027 
Germany -0.141 -0.133 0.172 -0.469 0.132 -0.401 0.077 
Spain -0.045 -0.018 0.120 -0.387 0.184 -0.206 0.078 
United Kingdom -0.047 -0.027 0.077 -0.165 0.028 -0.165 0.028 
 
Panel B: Stock Characteristics 
  Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median 
  SIZE SIGMA BTM DPS 
France 1Q -0.727 -0.741 -0.001 -0.002 -0.221 -0.160 -0.364 -0.342 
 5Q -0.069 -0.039 -0.421 -0.422 -0.114 -0.139 -0.059 -0.037 
 p-value 0.00  0.00  0.09  0.00  
Germany 1Q -0.262 -0.429 -0.077 -0.069 -0.155 -0.097 -0.223 -0.231 
 5Q -0.064 -0.060 -0.322 -0.350 -0.168 -0.223 -0.109 -0.145 
 p-value 0.02  0.00  0.81  0.06  
Spain 1Q -0.198 -0.153 0.009 0.004 -0.141 -0.059 -0.484 -0.225 
 5Q 0.017 0.015 -0.170 -0.132 0.013 -0.023 0.121 0.052 
 p-value 0.02  0.02  0.00  0.00  
United Kingdom 1Q -0.075 -0.048 0.001 0.010 -0.054 -0.006 -0.122 -0.038 
 5Q -0.021 -0.004 -0.198 -0.111 -0.068 -0.010 -0.035 -0.002 
  p-value 0.07   0.00   0.73   0.04   
 
Mean and Median for the quarterly EPS forecasts errors series. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of the sample data 
for each country. Panel B shows the descriptive statistics for stocks sorted by their volatility and grouped into quintiles 
based on size (SIZ), volatility (VOL), BTM ratio (BTM) and dividend per share (DPS). 1Q (5Q) is the portfolio of stocks 
belonging to the first (fifth) quintile. P-value is the significance level for the t-test for a difference in means between the two 
extreme quintiles. 
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Table II: Effect of Investor Sentiment on Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Errors 
Panel A: All Stocks 
France Germany Spain United Kingdom 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Sent⊥ -0.035 0.01 -0.057 0.00 -0.034 0.01 -0.032 0.00 
Skew⊥ 0.016 0.00 0.017 0.00 0.018 0.00 0.009 0.00 
AR(1) 0.457 0.00 0.632 0.00 0.375 0.00 0.020 0.77 
Full Sample Continental Ang-Sax vs Cont 
Ang-Sax vs Cont 
2005-2007 vs 
1997-2004 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Sent⊥ -0.040 0.00 -0.042 0.00 0.010 0.49 -0.081 0.24 
Skew⊥ 0.015 0.00 0.017 0.00 -0.008 0.01 -0.006 0.35 
AR(1) 0.371 0.00 0.488 0.00 -0.468 0.00 -0.326 0.15 
 
Panel B: Stock Characteristics 
SIZE VOL 
1Q 5Q DIFF 1Q 5Q DIFF 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value p-value 
FR 0.011 0.81 -0.008 0.29 0.68 -0.018 0.02 -0.090 0.03 0.08 
GE -0.090 0.11 -0.065 0.00 0.53 -0.025 0.09 -0.083 0.04 0.17 
SP -0.044 0.29 -0.006 0.10 0.39 -0.013 0.11 -0.220 0.00 0.00 
UK -0.122 0.00 -0.034 0.00 0.00 -0.017 0.00 -0.082 0.03 0.08 
Full Sample -0.062 0.01 -0.026 0.00 0.16 -0.019 0.00 -0.115 0.00 0.00 
Continental -0.042 0.16 -0.024 0.00 0.55 -0.019 0.00 -0.126 0.00 0.00 
Ang-Sax vs Cont -0.078 0.13 -0.011 0.31 0.20 0.001 0.89 0.044 0.37 0.40 
 
Ang-Sax vs Cont  
2005-2007 vs 
1997-2004 
0.092 0.79 -0.022 0.78 0.77 0.039 0.63 0.287 0.46 0.49 
BTM DPS 
1Q 5Q DIFF 1Q 5Q DIFF 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value p-value 
FR -0.040 0.07 -0.020 0.60 0.64 -0.017 0.61 -0.016 0.34 1.00 
GE -0.065 0.00 -0.016 0.66 0.24 -0.074 0.02 -0.027 0.01 0.19 
SP -0.020 0.74 0.001 0.98 0.80 -0.122 0.22 -0.008 0.40 0.27 
UK -0.017 0.59 -0.043 0.13 0.55 -0.118 0.00 -0.055 0.00 0.07 
Full Sample -0.033 0.02 -0.020 0.21 0.52 -0.077 0.00 -0.028 0.00 0.07 
Continental -0.039 0.03 -0.012 0.51 0.29 -0.065 0.03 -0.019 0.01 0.14 
Ang-Sax vs Cont 0.021 0.51 -0.030 0.40 0.28 -0.051 0.42 -0.035 0.03 0.80 
 
Ang-Sax vs Cont  
2005-2007 vs 
1997-2004 
0.246 0.18 0.119 0.66 0.80 0.064 0.85 -0.027 0.80 0.96 
 
Panel A shows the results of the regression for the whole sample data set for each country. The dependent variable is the consensus 
(median) EPS forecast errors  for all stocks in country c and quarter t. The independent variables are the investor sentiment 
variable Sent⊥orthogonal to macroeconomic variables (the industrial production index, durable and non-durable goods consumption, 
and the unemployment rate)) and a proxy of skewness in analyst forecast errors (SkewC┴). Panel B shows the results for stocks 
grouped into quintiles by size (SIZ), volatility (VOL), BTM ratio (BTM) and dividend per share (DPS). 1Q (5Q) is the portfolio of 
stocks belonging to the first (fifth) quintile. DIFF shows the p-value of the test for the difference between the beta coefficient of the 
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sentiment variable for two extreme quintiles for each stock characteristic. AR (1) model is applied to correct for serial correlation. 
OLS estimation is used with the Newey and West (1987) standard errors. Results are shown for each market analysed: France (FR), 
Germany (GE), Spain (SP) and the United Kingdom (UK). “Full sample” shows the results for all the markets considered. 
“Continental” shows the results for the sample made of data from the French, German, and Spanish stock markets. “Ang-Sax vs 
Cont” shows the estimates of the difference in coefficients between the aggregate results for the Continental subset versus those for 
the UK, together with their levels of significance. Ang-Sax vs Cont 2005-2007 vs 1997-2004 shows the estimated difference in 
coefficients between the Continental versus UK aggregate results for the period 2005-2007 versus those for the period 1997-2004, 
together with their levels of significance 
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Table III: Effect of Investor Sentiment on future volatility portfolio 
returns and analysts’ earnings forecast errors 
[6.1] [6.2] [6.3] [7.1] [7.2] 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
c 0.005 0.11 -0.002 0.47 -0.003 0.26 -0.024 0.00 -0.025 0.00 
DumFR -0.003 0.52 -0.003 0.48 -0.003 0.47 0.017 0.00 0.016 0.00 
DumGE -0.013 0.16 -0.011 0.14 -0.012 0.14 -0.005 0.45 -0.005 0.44 
DumSP 0.006 0.25 0.003 0.51 0.003 0.48 0.021 0.00 0.021 0.00 
Sent⊥ -0.019 0.00 -0.013 0.00 -0.010 0.00 -0.014 0.00 -0.010 0.00 
Sent⊥*DumFR 0.000 0.97 0.000 0.98 -0.001 0.77 -0.004 0.40 -0.007 0.16 
Sent⊥*DumGE -0.001 0.92 -0.003 0.64 -0.007 0.23 -0.008 0.17 -0.011 0.04 
Sent⊥*DumSP -0.004 0.68 0.003 0.66 0.002 0.69 0.007 0.12 0.005 0.24 
Fediff 0.004 0.45 0.004 0.41 0.005 0.37 -0.013 0.17 -0.008 0.36 
Fediff*DumFR 0.002 0.83 0.002 0.83 0.001 0.90 0.026 0.01 0.021 0.03 
Fediff*DumGE 0.010 0.36 0.013 0.22 0.011 0.32 0.011 0.24 0.007 0.45 
Fediff*DumSP 0.003 0.75 0.002 0.88 0.001 0.90 0.008 0.45 0.004 0.73 
MKT 0.701 0.00 0.686 0.00 0.698 0.00 0.503 0.00 0.520 0.00 
MKT*DumFR 0.390 0.01 0.404 0.01 0.390 0.01 0.350 0.00 0.341 0.00 
MKT*DumGE 0.223 0.09 0.271 0.04 0.235 0.07 0.467 0.00 0.438 0.00 
MKT*DumSP -0.158 0.28 -0.135 0.36 -0.142 0.32 0.143 0.17 0.128 0.21 
SMB 0.428 0.00 0.416 0.00 0.416 0.00 0.514 0.00 0.511 0.00 
SMB*DumFR -0.117 0.37 -0.105 0.42 -0.105 0.42 -0.165 0.08 -0.161 0.09 
SMB*DumGE -0.277 0.05 -0.250 0.07 -0.259 0.06 -0.261 0.04 -0.263 0.04 
SMB*DumSP -0.453 0.00 -0.432 0.00 -0.431 0.00 -0.520 0.00 -0.517 0.00 
HML -0.140 0.34 -0.132 0.34 -0.118 0.39 -0.194 0.15 -0.181 0.18 
HML*DumFR -0.004 0.98 -0.010 0.96 -0.017 0.94 0.149 0.38 0.163 0.34 
HML*DumGE -0.079 0.70 -0.070 0.72 -0.101 0.61 0.114 0.52 0.093 0.60 
HML*DumSP -0.109 0.67 -0.105 0.68 -0.123 0.63 0.049 0.79 0.034 0.86 
Sent 
Ang-Sax vs Cont   0.80   0.96   0.63   0.64   0.28 
FE 
Ang-Sax vs Cont   0.48   0.44   0.54   0.12   0.26 
 
Sent 
Ang-Sax vs Cont 
2005-2007 vs 
1997-2004   
0.16 
 
0.24 
 
0.54 
 
0.19 
 
0.41 
 
FE 
Ang-Sax vs Cont 
2005-2007 vs 
1997-2004   
0.16 
 
0.25 
 
0.23 
 
0.35 
 
0.14 
Results of the regression for the whole sample data set for each country. The dependent variable ( c ktlow
c
kthigh RR ++ − ,, ) is the self-
financed portfolio return based on volatility, for country c and holding period k. The independent variables are investor 
sentiment orthogonal to the  macroeconomic variables ( ⊥tSentG ) and the EPS forecast errors computed for the volatility 
portfolio as the difference between the average EPS forecast errors for high volatile stocks minus low volatile stocks( c tdiffFE , ). 
Fama and French (1993) risk factors are also included for each market.  To prevent the autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
problems associated with overlapping observations, the portfolio return is computed in calendar time approach following 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001). OLS estimation is used with the Newey and West (1987) standard errors. Results are shown for 
each market analysed: France (FR), Germany (GE), Spain (SP) and the United Kingdom (UK). “Ang-Sax vs Cont” shows the 
level of significance of the difference in coefficients between the aggregate results for the Continental subset versus those for the 
UK. Ang-Sax vs Cont 2005-2007 vs 1997-2004 shows the estimated difference in coefficients between the Continental versus UK 
aggregate results for the period 2005-2007 versus those for the period 1997-2004, together with their levels of significance 
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Table IV: Selection bias and investor sentiment 
 
FR GE SP UK Full Sample Continental 
Ang-Sax vs 
Cont 
Ang-Sax vs 
Cont 2005-
2007 vs 
1997-2004 
RU 0.264 0.274 0.223 0.225 0.244 0.255 -0.030 0.309 
RD -0.062 0.158 0.136 -0.758 -0.256 0.042 -0.256 0.723 
SB1 0.326 0.116 0.087 0.983 0.500 0.213 0.227 -0.414 
p-value 0.07 0.92 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.23 0.45 0.60 
SB2U5Q 0.173 0.155 1.222 0.700 0.794 0.935 -0.235 
 
p-value 0.905 0.783 0.079 0.094 0.019 0.093 0.686 
 
SB2D5Q 0.085 0.063 -0.241 0.002 -0.501 -0.092 0.095 
 
p-value 0.69 0.92 0.52 1.00 0.99 0.61 0.33 
 
SB2U1Q 0.075 0.195 0.008 -0.425 -0.032 0.092 -0.517 
 
p-value 0.76 0.91 0.99 0.13 0.93 0.85 0.58 
 
SB2D1Q 0.070 -0.263 -0.205 0.114 -0.027 -0.062 0.176 
 
p-value 0.70 0.81 0.54 0.85 0.92 0.84 0.38 
 
 
Average values of the RU and RD ratios, by country, for the entire set of stocks. Results of the SB1 and SB2 tests. To compute 
the SB2 test each quarter stocks are sorted by their volatility and grouped into quintiles. Then we calculate the percentage 
of quarters that each stock appears in each of the extreme quintiles, the first and fifth. Finally, the stocks selected as more 
volatile (less volatile) will be those that, for more than 60% of the quarters, appear in the fifth quintile (first quintile) and 
for less than 10% of the quarters in the first quintile (fifth quintile). The number of upward and downward EPS revisions is 
obtained from the FactSet database and we compute the number of revisions issued by the analysts following a firm during 
the last month of the quarter. The proxy for news is the unexpected stock return (20% extreme). We define news as the 
unexpected component of returns, ut= rt - ρt , where rt is the return on a stock from t - 1 to t  and ρt, is defined as E(rt|Φt-1), 
where Φt is the information set at time t. RU (RD) is the ratio between the number of upward EPS revisions (the number of 
EPS downward revisions) and the number of pieces of positive (negative) news on a quarterly basis, the SB1 test statistic is 
the difference between RU and RD. SB2U=E(RU/HS)-E(RU) and SB2D=E(RD/HS)- E(RD) are the conditioned Selection Bias (SB) 
Tests during high sentiment periods computed as the differences between the results of the expected RU and RD ratios 
conditional on high level sentiment (HS) and their respective unconditional ratios. “Full sample” shows the results for all 
the markets considered. “Continental” shows the results for the sample made of data from the French, German, and 
Spanish stock markets. “Ang-Sax vs Cont” shows the estimates of the difference in coefficients between the aggregate 
results for the Continental subset versus those for the UK, together with their levels of significance. Ang-Sax vs Cont 2005-
2007 vs 1997-2004 shows the estimated difference in coefficients between the Continental versus UK aggregate results for 
the period 2005-2007 versus those for the period 1997-2004, together with their levels of significance. 
 
 
36 
 
 
Table V: Abnormal Trading Volume Analysis 
Panel A: Abnormal Trading Volume during High Sentiment Periods 
FR GE SP UK 
Full 
Sample Cont 
Ang-Sax 
vs Cont 
5Q -0.148 -0.138 -0.099 -0.021 -0.102 -0.128 0.107 
1Q 0.055 -0.234 0.037 0.123 -0.005 -0.047 0.170 
p-value 0.02 0.51 0.08 0.01 0.48 0.14 0.64 
 
Panel B: Control by Buy Recommendations during High Sentiment Periods 
FR GE SP UK 
Full 
Sample Cont 
Ang-Sax 
vs Cont 
5Q -0.333 -0.200 -0.136 0.004 -0.166 -0.223 0.227 
1Q -0.021 -0.185 -0.011 0.132 -0.021 -0.072 0.204 
p-value 0.08 0.9 0.05 0.04 0.15 0.01 0.15 
 
Results of the abnormal trading volume analysis during high sentiment periods. We calculate the results for 
the extreme quintiles, the first (1Q) and fifth (5Q) based on volatility (Panel A). We also compute the results 
using portfolios constructed exclusively from stocks with strong buy recommendations during the study period 
(Panel B). Results are shown for each market analysed: France (FR), Germany (GE), Spain (SP) and the 
United Kingdom (UK). “Full sample” shows the results for all the markets considered. “Cont” shows the 
results for the sample made of data from the French, German, and Spanish stock markets. “Ang-Sax vs Cont” 
shows the estimates of the difference in coefficients between the aggregate results for the Continental subset 
versus those for the UK, together with their levels of significance. 
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Figure 1: Testing strategy 
SB1 
SB1>0 
Strategic Behavior 
Unconditional on 
Investor Sentiment 
SB1≤0 Absence of 
Strategic Behavior 
Unconditional on 
Investor Sentiment 
SB2 
SB1<0 
Strategic Behavior Conditional 
on Investor Sentiment 
SB1=0 
No Bias Conditional on Investor 
Sentiment 
SB1>0 
Complementary Analysis 
Strategic Behavior if 
Abnormal trading volume 
hard-to-value stocks > 
Abnormal trading volume 
bond-like stocks 
Cognitive Bias if  
Abnormal trading volume 
hard-to-value stocks ≤ 
Abnormal trading volume 
bond-like stocks 
38 
 
Appendix.  
BTM = book-to-market ratio characteristic used in the construction of the portfolios; we remove 
stocks with negative book-to-market values 
SIZ = size characteristic proxied by market value 
VOL = stock volatility measured as the standard deviation of past twelve-month returns 
DIV = Dividend Per Share ratio 
SentUS = proxy of US sentiment; this variable is used in Baker and Wurgler (2006) and available at 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jwurgler (see Section 3.2 for details) 
SentEU = European sentiment index that captures the overall level of investor sentiment across four 
key European markets sentiment (see Section 3.2 for the details) 
SentFR = French investor sentiment (see Section 3.2 for the details) 
SentGE = German investor sentiment (see Section 3.2 for the details) 
SentSP = Spanish investor sentiment (see Section 3.2 for the details) 
SentUK = UK investor sentiment (see Section 3.2 for the details) 
SentG = global sentiment; this is a composite index formed by the common component in the SentUS 
and SentUE indexes (see Section 3.2 for the details) 
EPSFY1consensus (median) = one-year-ahead Earnings Per Share consensus median forecast for 
fiscal year y 
EPSactual = actual Earnings Per Share obtained in this fiscal year y by the company 
FE= Earnings Per Share  forecast errors computed as the difference between EPSactual and 
EPSFY1 for the fiscal year y, scaled by the absolute value of EPSFY1consensus (see Section 3.3 for 
details) 
SentG ⊥ = global investor sentiment orthogonal to economic variables to control for possible changes 
in the economic cycle; the macroeconomic variables considered are the industrial production index, 
durable and non-durable goods consumption and the unemployment rate 
Skew ⊥  = proxy for the skewness in analyst forecast errors (Gu and Wu, 2001) 
Rhigh - Rlow = self-financed portfolio return. 
DSentG = a dummy that is equal 1 if investor sentiment at the beginning of the year y is above the 
median, and zero otherwise. 
SB1 = Selection Bias 1; defined as the difference between the Ru and Rd ratios 
SB2 = Selection Bias 2; compares the expected Ru and Rd ratios that are conditional on high investor 
sentiment with their respective unconditional ratios. 
